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REFERENCE IN FICTIONAL TEXTS 
Introduction 
Zoltan Kanyo 
A. Jozsef University, Szeged 
Let us begin with a terminological question: Is the 
title of our working group correctly formulated at all? Do 
not the terms "reference" and "fictional text" stand in 
such opposition that any efforts to reconcile them are nec-
essarily nullified? Certainly I do not hold this opinion: 
on the contrary, I am convinced that it is perfectly legi-
timate to speak about reference in fictional texts, but I 
would not be surprised if, e.g., a literary critic found 
this formulation strange or even inadmissible. Terminolo-
gical disagreements are as a rule nothing but the materi-
alisation of conceptual divergencies and as a matter of fact 
we should take into consideration right from the beginning 
the fact that there are different conceptions about fic— 
tionality and possibility of reference in fictional texts in 
accordance with the scientific paradigm which one assumes to 
be right. Our discussion would benefit considerably from the 
systematization of these special paradigms, this task can-
not, however, be accomplished here in an extensive form, as 
it implies a minute and thorough historical treatment of at 
least three branches of science which all have a respectable 
tradition of some thousand years. What I can offer instead 
is to throw light on some main problems which I consider 
from the point of view of our present discussion rather de-
cisive in connection with a theory or conception which can 
be held to be representative of the development of the 
branch of science or even - if this word can be allowed in 
this context - to be an archetype. 
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Several arguments can be advanced In favour of ordering 
our short overall view so that poetics should be treated 
first: as everybody knows the first theoretical conceptions 
about literature were inseparable from the perception of its 
fictional character. Man became aware of the theoretical 
problem of fictionality in poetics, and even today fiction-
ality and literature are so closely associated that they are 
sometimes confused, i.e. it is thought that everything which 
is literature, is fictional, and everything which is fic-
tional is literature, or the one is taken as a subclass of 
the other. These views are certainly erroneous as fiction 
can be used in any field of research and even in everyday 
communication without any poetic goal or effect. Literature 
offers nonetheless the most impressive examples of fictional 
texts and literary theory does not cease from producing 
newer and newer explanations for this peculiar phenomenon. 
We would have a veritable embarras de richesse if we were to 
report all the conceptions which have been elaborated in 
literary study under the heading of fictionality, realism, 
etc. Instead of that I shall confine my remarks to a clas-
sical work which determined the development in this fiel'd in 
a rather elementary way and is - curious as it may sound -
in most respects superior to its followers. I mean Aristot-
le's Poetics, a work which is nowadays seen in quite a dif-
ferent light from some decades ago thanks to the philologi-
cal-research of recent years and to the theoretical inves-
tigations of modern poetics although these are based on 
methods and principles other than those on which Aristote-
lian Poetics rested, albeit appearing as a true analogon of 
the Aristotelian teohne. What I am aiming at in connection 
with this classical work of theoretical poetics is a rather 
sacrilegious attempt at translating the main theses and 
presuppositions of this work concerning fictionality into 
the metalanguage of modern poetics and at scrutinizing the 
consequences which follow from them in order to make them 
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more understandable in a way which does not contradict the 
original Aristotelian spirit. The main arguments of Aristo-
telian Poetics as concerns our topic can be summed up as 
follows: 
.1; There is a class of human activities determined by spe-
cial features which can be accounted for by general human 
abilities in imitation, rhythm and melody. This class of 
activities will be named poetic activities. 
2; The original manifestations of poetic activities are spe-
cial forms of oral communication. 
3; Poetic activity imitates human actions In well structured 
stories. 
4; The actions narrated in poetic works represent, according 
to the nature of poetic activity, possible or necessary 
actions. 
5; Poetic activities as a class of human actions are gov-
erned by general, partly metaphysical, rules. 
These theses need some elucidation and comment however, 
we can touch here only upon the most important connections. 
The first mentioned thesis expresses the assumption 
that the predicates "poetic", "literature", "poeticality" 
"literariness", "estheticity" etc. can be applied to a well-
defined class of activities or to the results of these ac-
tivities. Although supported both by the widespread naive 
conception about literature and by the main schools of mod-
ern „poetics from the Russian Formalists to Generative Po-
etics, this assumption seems rather dubious, since neither 
traditional nor modern poetics have succeeded in setting up 
a full list of features by means of which the class of po-
etic phenomena could be unambigously determined and any such 
attempt proves necessarily hopeless in an intensive examina-
tion. We do not wish to deny that there are human abilities 
which establish some features recurrent in some or even all 
poetic activities or texts, but this is only half of the 
truth, because there are also different abilities which can-
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not be explained on the basis of a static anthropological 
structure. There is a possible solution of this problem if 
we raise the second thesis out of the rather subordinate 
position it occupies in Aristotelian Poetics and declare 
it as central. In this way poetic activity appears as a 
special form of communication which rests upon convention. 
It will certainly presuppose some human abilities, but in 
addition- to this it will take into account some other fac-
tors as well, e.g. the special interests and goals of the 
community, whether the convention determining the special 
poetic activity is commonly accepted, institutionalized or 
is known only by a minority or even is persecuted, etc. In 
this view poetic activity and consequently literature have 
reality only in the context of a historically, sociological-
ly and culturally, determined community disposing of a com-
mon convention or conventions and the comprehensive notion 
of literature or poetic activity can at the very best be 
conceived of as a family notion, in the sense of the late 
Wittgenstein, comprising a series of various literary lan-
guage games. In full agreement with similar statements made 
by Searle^" and others I would insists upon the fact that, 
there is no convention embracing all the factual and pos-
sible poetic activities, and consequently there being no 
well definable poetic activity or literature as such, it 
cannot also be postulated as the starting-point of the the-
ory. Aristotle's approach has for this reason some funda-
mental difficulties, namely, it is not possible to define 
the subject of poetics according to his proposal. 
Among the distinctive features of poetic activities he 
mentions first mimesis. This much discussed notion expres-
ses an inborn human ability and at the same time it points 
to the special semantic significance of such activities or 
of their results as a rule4 As we are here interested in 
semantic questions this notion deserves some examination. 
If anybody thinks that "imitation" is too narrow a concept 
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tion for literary semantics, he should be reminded that 
this term should not be taken literally but as a special 
sort of understanding or knowledge dependent on factual re-
lations - the fact of this dependance will certainly be -
admitted generally, although its scope will be variously 
determined. As to the Aristotelian position according to 
the 3rd thesis we have to take into consideration the fact 
that mimesis, i.e. the correspondence between events and 
narration, rests upon the same structure of action in both 
cases, or, to put it in another way, narration imitates ac-
tual events in so far as the structures of real events are 
mirrored in the fundamental linguistic and narrative set-
tings serving as essential components in narration. Narra-
tion itself is labelled "mythos", a word that had the same 
connotation as the term fiction has nowadays and is defined 
as follows: "by 'mithos' X mean the arrangement of the 
2 
events" . This means that at the level of narration there 
is no question of direct imitation, since narration is con-
sidered as constructed or invented according to the re-
quirements of beauty by the poet, this maker of mythos and 
verses. The question of imitation and of reference can how-
ever be raised in a more general connection: If the poet 
invents a story then it has no referents which could be 
pointed out as such in the actual world, but it still ap-
plies to life as it represents an action structure which is 
bound to be analogous to a real action structure. Therefore 
if it proves to be consistent and ifulfills all the social 
and cultural requirements for which Aristotle has the la-
conic expression beauty, this action will be conceived of 
as a possible or a necessary action, i.e. something that 
can or must happen. In this sense narration acquires gener-
ality by.transcending the linkage to the actual world and 
to a series of concrete actions which at a primitive stage 
can be characteristic of certain poetic activities (e.g. 
iambic poetryl and this transcendence that poetry achieves 
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according to its very nature Beans seaantically a shift 
from actual reference to Modality. It should be emphasized 
that Aristotle assumes, just like modern modal logic* that 
the actual wo&ld is a possible state of affairs, therefore 
he does not see any problem in the embedding of reports of 
actual events or persons in poetic narration. As he writes 
"there is nothing to prevent acme actual events being the 
kind that might probably happen, i.e. are capable of hap-
pening""*. 
I cannot at present treat in full the Aristotelian con-
ception about reference and generality in poetic narration. . 
This theme, however, deserves thorough attention, since the 
sense of the conception outlined before has been profoundly 
misunderstood in literary theory and the consequences of 
this misunderstanding exert .even today a negative: influence 
on theoretic research in literary study. The basis of this • 
misinterpretation was the inability to comprehend the broad 
and deep logical foundations of this poetics, the original 
logical notions having been mutilated and the modality prob-
lem taken into parenthesis. Everything had to be valued in 
accordance with actuality, and this constraint and its • 
frustration gave birth to several peculiar ideas in poetics 
such a sociological types as referents, the opposition be-
tween naive imitation and free creation as archetypal poetic 
forms of self-expression, the explication of truth in lit-
erature by means of a category of particularity that should 
unify in itself generality and individuality in a dialecti-
cal way, etc. I do not wish to maintain that the history of 
literary theory has been a mere decline since Aristotle's 
death. The last mentioned thesis points to the fact that his 
Poetics followed a different scientific paradigm that the 
one modern scientists profess and I do believe that in me~ 
thodological respect there is not only a difference, but an 
effective development, made possible by empirical research 
and by repressing mere speculation. But speculation has its 
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merits as well and a real theoretical revival of poetics 
can only be expected if poetics again acquires the theore--
tical knowledge it had as a basis in Aristotle's time. 
Modern logic was for a long time not very favorable to 
theoretic research in fiction or generally to literary se-
mantics; this rather negative appreciation can be maintained 
even if we acknowledge the importance of the aesthetic or 
poetic conceptions of Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein and other 
classics of modern logic. What literary semantics theoreti-
cally needs is the formulation of adequate truth conven-
tions for literary texts, I mean the explication of naive 
intuition by means of which the members of a community may 
know, what states of affairs prevail in a narrative work be-
lpnging to a certain tradition. The truth of literature is 
an intricate notion, but we certainly need it if we want to 
make certain statements and inferences about literary texts. 
In connection with Aristotelian Poetics I have tried to ex-
plain that there is no literature and literariness but only 
concrete literary language games, and consequently there is 
no truth in literature in general, but according to the con-
vention underlying the special communication forms - an • 
extremely transitional relation determined by pragmatic 
factors. The claim to formulate truth conditions for fic-
tional texts did not meet with understanding in classical 
extensional logic, there was even doubt cast on it by the 
program for the ideal language that should not contain any 
fictitious terms. Modern logics was interested first of ali 
in truth conditions according to the actual world, there-
fore a different truth-relation is taken into consideration 
here than the relation I consider central for literary se-
mantics: in that case we were concerned with the inner se-
mantic constitution of texts according to the underlying 
convention, here we have to compare the states of affairs 
presented in the texts with the actual states of affairs; in 
the first case we try to explicate the understanding of the 
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text, in the second the stress is laid upon ontological 
considerations. I do not intend to deny the importance of 
this ontological question for the theory of fiction, how-
ever, I consider it secondary as compared to the semantic 
one, and the fact that modern logic raised it first con-
tributed mainly to the confusion in the application of log-
ical methods to fictional texts. In principle there are 
three possible answers to the question of what the truth-
value of sentences containing fictional terms is, each of 
which determines a type of conception in modern logic. The 
three answers are the following: sentences containing fic-
tional terms are per definitionem true - the Meinongian 
type, they are per definitionem false - the Russellian 
type, or they cannot have truth-values - the Frege - Straw-
son line. These different solutions appear at face value to 
be equals side by side, but they have rather different pres-
tige and one may wonder if the Meinongian type belongs to 
modern logic at all as some of its theses contradict clas-
sical symholic logic in such a way that this approach was 
for a long time totally discredited in modern logic. Due to 
the essential change that took place recently in logic the 
Meinongian views are considered much more favorably today, 
but this does not lessen the difference between the Fregean 
and the Meinongian ontological presuppositions, I.e. the 
Meinongian type.remains a special class some of the repré-
sentants of which are to be found among poetic and aesthe-
tic conceptions, e.g. the well known concept of the Tartu-
school of the secondary modelling system.bears unmistakably 
Meinongian traits. 
The Russellian type was influential for a certain time, 
but it has not many supporters nowadays, even if certain of 
its principles are henceforward acknowleged. The main prob-
lem of this approach from our point of view is its total 
insensitivity tov/ards the semantic question of literary 
works. In his "Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy" Rus-
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sell writes: "... to maintain that Hamlet, for example, 
exists in his own world, namely, in the world of Shakes-
peare's imagination just as truly as (say) Napoleon ex-
isted in the ordinary world, is to say something deliber-
ately confusing, or else confused to a degree which is 
scarcely credible. There is only one world, the 'real' 
world: Shakespeare's imagination is a part of it, and the 
thoughts that he had in writing Hamlet are real. So are the 
thoughts that we have in reading the play. But it is of the 
very essence of fiction that only the thoughts, feelings, 
etc. in Shakespeare and his readers are real, and that there 
is not, in addition to them, an objective Hamlet."'' Russell's 
argument can be summed up as follows: fictitious names are 
concealed existential descriptions which do not denote any 
entity, consequently the sentences containing them must be 
false, if something were said about fiction or literature in 
a well-founded way, then this phenomenon had to be trans-
lated into a physicalistic or behavouristic language - a 
program very impressively solved by Reichenbach in his Ele-
ments of Symbolic logic . Apart from the well-known prob-
lems of the description theory this approach implies that 
there is no inner logical solution for the fundamental se-
mantical problem of fictional texts, this statement is 
theoretically as unacceptable as the proposed physicalistic 
reduction. 
- Beyond dispute the Frege-Strawson line can be consid-
ered as the most respected in logic and in certain schools 
of literary study as well. It is sufficient if we mention 
that logicians such as Frege, Strawson, Ryle, E.G. Moore 
and a scholar who began a new period in literary theory, R, 
Ingarden, are party to this line . In spite of many deep 
insights into the structure of fictional texts which cannot 
even be tentatively enumerated here I should like to empha-
size that as far as a possible solution of the central 
question of literary semantics is concerned it does not make 
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any tangible difference if the sentences containing fic-
tional names are considered false or having no truth value 
and, in this respect, I agree with Mr. Bernath's and Mr. 
Csuri's position concerning Frege's conception abput lit-
erature . 
All these models based on extensional logic belong to 
the prehistory of the logic of fiction and its formulation 
is the task of today. As Professor Woods is going to give a 
systematic overview of the recent discussions it is need-
less for me to recapitulate the main tendencies, instead of 
which I wish to point to some questions to which I attach 
importance. The main problem is to formulate the truth-con-
dition for fictional texts in such a way that these special 
conditions should not contradict the general truth-condi-
tions, i.e. the validity of these conditions should be lim-
ited to the semantic constitution of the relevant communica-, 
tion forms and relatedness of these connections to actuality 
should be taken into account in quite different terms. Sev-
eral proposals have been outlined of which I shall mention 
three. The first is the introduction of a story operator 
most Impressively represented in John Wood's The Logic of 
Fiction which is certainly one of the most important con-
tributions to this question in the last years7. I must say, 
however, that I do not sympathize with this solution be-
cause there is no linguistic evidence on which such an op-
erator could be based, the same text could be - as Castaiie-
da has very convincingly pointed out - without the slightest 
change a fiction and a non-fiction, and if the story opera-
tor does not refer to the linguistic structure, but to the 
fact that the text is being uttered in a special literary 
communication form, then the story operator reflects a prag-
matic feature of the text which cannot be conceived of as 
generally valid special logic or semantics but as dependant 
on the convention underlying the text. I presume therefore 
that Wood's olim operator should be reinterpretated in a 
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pragmatic sense. But this operation can be spared if we fol-
low Routley's proposition to base the logic of fiction on 
context logic. The main thesis of his approach, that "there 
is no general uniform logic of fiction ... each work will Q 
have its own internal logic" corresponds to the ideas I am 
trying to explain here. I certainly consider Routley's ap-
proach as a whole very promising, even if context logic it-
self is contested by some logicians. The third solution is 
the application of the central notion of modal logic "pos-
sible world" to fictional texts. It has the advantage that 
by means of the model theoretic apparatus a lot of problems, 
can be technically solved unambigously. The main question 
is, however, whether fiction can be considered at all as a 
possible world in the sense of intensional logic. Certainly 
we have no longer a comprehensive notion of fiction and an 
argument pointing out that there are narrative worlds rep-
resenting logically impossible connections does not disturb 
us. We do know about conventions of building up nonsensical 
texts, but their existence is not a proof against the ap-
plicability of this notion to any fictional texts whatso-
ever. I mean there are classes of tests to which this notion 
can be applied, but not without certain essential changes. 
In this respect Mr. Bernath and Mr. Csuri will present an 
interesting experiment, whereas I should like to emphasize 
that the truth-conditions determined by pragmatical conven-
tions can only be stated empirically in connection with the 
community making use of the relevant communication form. In 
this respect I should like to touch upon one of the most 
discussed questions of the logic of fiction, namely what 
kind of entities are referred to in fictional texts. Profes-
sor Pavel's study and Professor Pelc's paper are devoted to 
this topic. I should like, however, to formulate briefly a 
somewhat different position. The majority of the theoreti-
cians of literature and even a great number of logicians are 
inclined to take fictional characters such as Hamlet, Anna 
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Karenina, Sherlock Holmes, etc. for non-actual but well-
individuated objects, a view supported either by pure anal-
ogies or by Meinongian ontology or by the fallacy that the 
possible world-semantics commits one to choose the possible 
contants and to give them extensional interpretations, etc. 
I do not wish to accept this rather doubtful ontology and 1 o 
think the analyst having in view such well-known fictional 
characters is considerably misled, if he tries to determine 
the properties of fictional characters according to these 
most representative figures. Whoever has analysed folk-
tales - a genre in which fiction appears in all likelihood 
historically for the first time - knows that there is no 
need for names, a singular indefinite description ("an old 
man"l or a definite description (."the king") do the same. 
For convenience one can - as Aristotle mentioned - "tack on Q 
names afterward" , but by this dubbing nothing has ontolo-
gically changed, there is no new entity coming into being, 
the name not being any more than a textual device of 
crossreference. As to the fictional character itself, it 
should not be conceived of as a constant but rather a vari-
able which is at the same time determined by a number of 
properties prescribed by the game that involves it. If X 
say, let us imagine a game of chess, White applying strategy 
A, Black adopting strategy B, then White and Black are not 
two entities, but two roles of players defined by the game, 
logically explicated as two variables having the correspond-
ing predicates in the scope of existential quantifiers. This 
is too simple an example to overcome all the difficulties in 
the semantics of fiction, nevertheless it points to what my 
deep conviction is: if there is a solution to this discus-
sion, it is not to be found in ontological speculations but 
in empirical investigations revealing the inner structure of 
fictional narratives. 
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As fas as linguistics is concerned I was complied in 
the course of my explanation to take sides in one of the 
main linguistic discussions going on between defenders of an 
abstract language system of a Saussurian type and-the par-
tisans of a primarily conventionally determined language 
concept. For the sake of order X should like to make it 
clear that I belong to the last mentioned group, i.e. I con-
sider that theoretical problems of literature, fiction and 
even reference can only be satisfactorily solved if we con-
sider the use of the texts as basic. Only in so far as the 
contextual background is systematically taken into account 
can the problem of deictic particles, articles, pronouns 
- so differently treated in different grammatics, but in its 
importance generally underestimated - be settled in an ade-
quate way. Nowadays there are two main approaches to this 
problem, the one I would label the extension of logic to 
natural language the other the recurrence of self-deter-
mining linguistic principles. Let us begin with the last 
one. This conception could hardly be illustrated better 
than by the following extracts of Mr, Bierwisch's classical, 
and anything but outdated, study "On classifying Semantit 
Features": "... an interpretation of reference indices and 
corresponding arguments along the lines (of usual logical 
analysis - Z.K.I must be given up. Instead of this I pro-
pose to consider, an argument X^ as a variable to be sub-
stituted by the representation of a fraction of the (real 
or fictious) universe talked about. This fraction is made 
up from one or more equivalent objects or individuals which 
are singled out for separate predication only under specific 
conditions. These conditions are either part of the predi-
cate to be applied or expressed by particular specifiers and . 
quantifiers such as 'every', 'all', 'two', 'many', etc. ... 
I suspect however that the proposed concept of 'global ref^ 
erence' cannot be explained in terms of more basic notions 
of a semantic theory, but must be taken as a primitive no-
/ 
- 26 -
tion itself. I presume, in other words that in this respect 
the quantification theory and the linguistic semantic theo-
ry are radically different in that they take opposing di-
rections: whereas quantification theory takes individuals 
as the starting point from which exhaustive and partial sets 
are constructed by means of universal and existential quan-
tification, linguistic semantics probably has to start with 
sets as primitive terms which may further be specified with 
respect to the participation to their elements in particular 
states of affairs"10. Though Mr. Bierwisch is one of the 
linguists from whom X personally have learned the most, I 
cannot follow him in this respect. More exactly I agree with 
him in the detils, not however in the conclusions he seems 
to be compelled to draw. Since I have not enough time to 
propound my opinion let me formulate the hypothesis under-
lying my studies in this direction to the effect that logi-
cal and linguistic relations should not be opposed to each 
other and that logical relations reflect as a rule the ab-
stract correspondences in the structure of natural language. 
However, in order to get an adequate picture of this last we 
need to take into account over and above the logical connec-
tions the features of the context the text is embedded in, 
as the consideration of context-relations may considerably 
transform the logical pattern. This principle was by the 
way very convincingly adapted by E. Lang, who unfortunately 
could not accept our invitation to participate in our dis-
cussion, in his excellent text-theoretic book "Semantik der 
koordinativen Verkniifung". According to this principle my 
starting-point would not be a primitive notion "global ref-
erence" presupposing sets as primitive terms, but the usual 
distinctions by means of the appertinance of individuals to 
sets and of quantification.In accordance with the proposals 
of Bellert, van Dijk and others, certain features of the 
reference indices should be connected with the referential 
or the pragmatic context, classes of reference indices seem 
to be specialised in order to indicate a certain type of 
determination of the objects they refer to. It is not pos-
sible and not even necessary to explain the theoretical 
basis of this conception, as I have done it elsewhere12. 
What I have to do for illustrations's sake is to show that 
it is possible to give a consistent explication of the 
examples that led Mr. Bierwisch to the contested conclu-
sions within the scope of the proposed theory. Mr. Bier-
wisch' s examples refer to the use of the definite article 
"the" determining nouns in plural such as 
1; The boys hit the girls. 
2; The piicemen rounded up the demonstration. 
3; The whites oppress the negroes. 
4; The Chinese of the seventh century knew porcelain. 
The definite article is as a matter of fact a homonymic 
morphological unit for at least the following three differ-
ent types of reference: 
1; the generic one corresponding to the universal quanti-
fier, 
2; the referential one defining the speaker's reference to 
an object or a set of objects, 
3; the existential one corresponding to the existential 
quantifier, this use being determined by syntactic con-
structions and the semantic features of the nouns and 
the verbs taking part in them. 
Although Mr. Bierwisch's examples can certainly be differ-
ently interpreted, the problem Mr, Bierwisch pointed to is 
obviously joined to the referential use. Mr. Bierwisch is 
certainly right in pointing out that it is impossible to 
give a correct account of our first example by means of 
quantificational logic, since a quantification based on sets 
consisting of individuals compels us to take sides, viz, if 
every boy hit every girl or some boys hit some girls, etc. 
All possible variants do not seem to correspond with the 
original sentence. He is also right when in connection with 
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the third example he states: "Rather the groups referred 
to are understood as a plurality whose individuals are not 
singled out with respect to participation or nonparticipa-
tion in the states and processes in question. .It is claimed 
only that the group as a whole is concerned"13. This how-
ever is not the consequence of the indeterminacy of refer-
ence in natural language, but is a rather normal effect of 
plurality. The definite article with a singular noun in its 
scope introduces an individual, that with a plural noun, 
however, a set the power of which is greater than one. By 
the use of the definite article and plural in general the 
speaker is not committed to anything more than the fact 
there is a set consisting of more than one element to which 
the speaker intends to refer. If he wishes to be more ex-
plicit, he has several numerical quantifiers at his disposal 
and he can very well explain how many individuals are con-
cerned, since natural language has this possibility as well 
and it seems not at all a subordinated special case. In a 
word, it seems to me to be possible to preserve the essen-
tial insights of Mr. Bierwisch's analysis without being • 
compelled to give up the inclusion of logical and set-theo-
retical relations in linguistics. 
A last remark about narrative research: after the dec-
line of the structuralistic approaches of the sixties the 
interest in empirical research - I do not mean interpreta-
tion - has perceptibly diminshed. Dr. Rauh's paper resuming 
the main results of her doctoral dissertation makes an ex-
ception that we are very glad to include in our program. 
The general scene is, however, not very reassuring: on the 
one hand theoretic experiments amounting to the mere appli-
cation of theories originally devoted to the explication of 
quite different connections, on the other hand empirical 
research and interpretations with insufficient theoretical 
foundations while the decisive questions, e.g. the question 
of a narrative syntax, are not even raised. Though the pres-
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ent conditions are perhaps not very propitious for -the 
undertaking of such an enterprise, scientific development 
gives important impulses. I have to mention first of all, 
action theory and game theory which promise to outline a 
Structure, not static or linear as the structuralists have 
been thinking, but dynamic and dialectical, consisting in 
the strategic moves of opponent agents. Action theory and 
game theory have a deep influence on linguistics today and 
there are even some experiments on narrative topics as well. 
However, in this field, a rather old work remains the most 
instructive - Aristotle's Poetics, 
Thus arriving at .the starting point of my exposition, 
I put an end to my introductory remarks. If the listener is 
a bit disappointed that here X have raised so many questions 
without giving detailed answers, he should be reminded that 
nothing other could be my aim but to put the questions and 
to formulate them in a provocative way. The questions will 
be answered by our participants who are all distinguished 
specialists in their fields and should the listener be 
dissatisfied with one" answer or another, he is kindly re-
quested to look for an adequate solution and to work with 
us in the discussion. 
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